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UNION .REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW 
AND .REALITY: THE AUTHORS RESPOND 
TO THE CRITICS 
Stephen B. Goldberg* 
Julius G. Getman** 
Jeanne M. Brett*** 
In llnion Representation Elections: Law and Reality (hereinafter 
Law and Reality without cross-reference), we examined the desira-
bility of continued National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) regula-
tion of pre-election campaigning. Our central finding, based upon a 
study of thirty-one elections, and interviews with over 1000 employ-
ees, was that unlawful campaigning has no greater effect on em-
ployee voting behavior in a union representation election than does 
lawful campaigning. Hence, we recommended that the Board 
should no longer attempt to distinguish between lawful and unlawful 
campaigning; that the results of an election, once conducted, should 
be final; and that speech should be wholly free - that the Board 
should neither set aside elections nor find unfair labor practices 
based on oral or written communications by an employer or a union. 
In place of Board regulation of pre-election campaigning, we 
suggested that each party be given the opportunity to respond to the 
campaigning of the other - a form of private regulation. Since the 
employer can presently hold meetings of employees on working time 
and premises, we recommended that the union be given a similar 
opportunity when the employer exercises this right. Finally, we rec-
ommended the use of quicker and more effective remedies than are 
presently available when an employer engages in retaliatory actions 
against union supporters, particularly during a union organizing 
campaign. 
These recommendations, and the findings on which they were 
based, have met with a mixed reaction in the various forums in 
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which they have been considered - the NLRB, state labor relations 
boards, the courts, Congress, and the academic journals. In this Ar-
ticle, we shall summarize and comment upon those responses, focus-
ing primarily upon the responses of the Board and the academic 
critics. 
The Board's response to our recommendations has been quite 
limited. In Shopping Kart Market, Inc. 1 a majority of the Board ac-
cepted one recommendation, holding over the dissent of Chairman 
John Fanning and Member Howard Jenkins, that, with few excep-
tions, it would no longer set aside elections on the basis of mislead-
ing campaign statements. Subsequently, however, one member of 
the Shopping Kart majority, Peter Walther, resigned. He was re-
placed by John Truesdale, who promptly joined Chairman Fanning 
and Member Jenkins in voting to overrule Shopping Kart.2 None of 
our other recommendations has yet been addressed by the Board. 
Our recommendation that elections not be set aside on the basis 
of misleading campaign statements has fared somewhat better at the 
state level. Thus, Shopping Kart, which accepted this recommenda-
tion, has been adopted by the Connecticut State Board of Labor Re-
lations3 and the Florida Public Employee Relations Commission,4 
but rejected by the District of Columbia Board of Labor Relations.5 
The Nebraska Court of Industrial Relations, while not formally en-
dorsing Shopping Kart, held that a material misrepresentation would 
not constitute grounds for setting aside an election in the absence of 
evidence that the misrepresentation influenced the voters or had a 
substantial effect on the outcome of the election.6 Since such evi- · 
dence will rarely be forthcoming,7 this amounts to a de facto adop-
tion of the Shopping Kart approach. · 
The judicial response to Law and Reality has been limited. 
While some courts have noted that the book casts doubt upon the 
I. 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977). 
2. See General Knit of Cal., Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978). 
3. City of New Haven, Decision No. 1760 (Conn. State Bd. of Labor Relations June I, 
1979) (unpublished). 
4. Fort Lauderdale City Employees Benevolent Assn, 4 F.P.E.R.C. ~ 4176 (1978). 
5. Metropolitan Police Dept., Decision No. 20 (D.C.B.L.R. 1978) (unpublished). The 
Florida Board's decision was made before General Knit, but was subsequently reaffirmed, in a 
decision which explicitly declined to follow that case. Teamsters Local 991 v. Leon County 
Bd. of County Commrs., 5 F.P.E.R.C. ~ 10354 (1979). The Connecticut Board's decision was 
made after General Knit, but did not refer to it. 
6. See Nebraska Assn. of Pub. Employees v. Nebraska Dept. of Educ. 102 L.R.R.M. 3063 
(Neb. 1979). 
7. See text following note 29 i,ifra. 
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standards by which the Board regulates pre-election campaigning, 
they have viewed themselves as obliged to defer to the Board's pre-
sumed expertise. Thus, the Ninth Circuit stated: 
It is tempting to us to seize upon the study and go farther than the 
Board did in Shopping Kart, holding that we will no longer sustain 
orders setting aside elections, or set aside orders sustaining them, in 
cases of threats as well as in cases of claimed misrepresentations in 
election campaigns. However, we resist the temptation because it is the 
Board, not the courts, that is presumed to be expert in this field. 8 
The Congressional response to our recommendations has been 
considerably more wide-ranging. Law and Reality was published 
while the Labor Law Reform Act of 1977 was being drafted, and the 
Act incorporated several of its recommendations, albeit in modified 
form. 
Both the bill that passed the House,9 and that which was reported 
out of the Senate Human Resources Committee,10 contained provi-
sions designed to lessen the Board's regulation of speech, 11 to in-
crease its remedial powers, 12 and to provide Union access to 
company premises to respond to pre-election campaign speeches de-
livered by the employer on working time and premises. 13 To be sure, 
none of those provisions was as broad as our recommendations, and 
it would be fatuous to suggest that their inclusion was based solely, 
or even primarily, upon those recommendations. Still, the recom-
mendations were considered, 14 the Labor Law Reform Act did move 
the law in the direction of those recommendations, and, at least in 
that respect, the successful filibuster in the Senate was unfortunate. 15 
The response to the study in the academic journals was extensive, 
particularly in light of its multidisciplinary nature, which could be 
seen as calling for reviewers capable of assessing not only the labor 
8. Oshman's Sporting Goods, Inc. v. NLRB, 586 F.2d 699, 702 (9th Cir. 1978). See Peer-
less of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 576 F.2d 119, 122 n.3 (7th Cir. 1978). For judicial comments 
on the results of .our preliminary work (Getman, Goldberg & Herman, The NLRB Voling 
Study: A Preliminary Report, l J. LEG. Sruo. 223 (1972)), see Harlan No. 4 Coal Co. v. 
NLRB, 490 F.2d 117, 123 n.5 (6th Cir. 1974); Henderson Trumbull Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 
501 F.2d 1224, 1233 (2d Cir. 1974) (Feinberg, J., dissenting). 
9. H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
10. S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). 
11. See § 9(c)(6)(D)(i). 
12. See §§ 10(c)(2)-10(c)(3). 
13. See § 6(b)(l)(A). 
14. See Report of Committee on Education and Labor on H.R. 8410, H.R. Rep. No. 95-
637, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 29, 24-35, 38-39 (1977); Report of Committee on Human Re-
sources on S. 2467, S. Rep. No. 411-22, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, 22, 23-24 (1977). 
15. For a more extensive comment upon the political maneuvering that led to the defeat of 
the Labor Law Reform Act, and some possible consequences of that maneuvering, see Mills, 
Flawed Victory in Labor Reform, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1979, at 92-102. 
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law recommendations, but also the data collection methodology and 
the statistical analysis. One law review dealt with the multidiscipli-
nary nature of the study by inviting a psychologist and a law teacher 
to write a joint review, 16 and another law review published separate 
reviews by a lawyer, 17 a professor of labor law, 18 a labor econo-
mist, 19 a professor of industrial relations, 20 and a labor reporter and 
editor.21 Most legal journals, however, were content with a single 
review, normally written by a lawyer or labor law teacher.22 Re-
views by persons with a social science research background were 
published by a number of social science jourhals.23 There were also 
a number of commentaries on the study, and on the Board's brief 
acceptance of one of its recommendations, in the popular press. 24 
A response to our critics requires a brief recapitulation of our 
.findings and conclusions, to which we tum next. That will be fol-
lowed by our responses, first to the Board, then to the academic crit-
ics. 
I. THE VOTING STUDY: A RECAPITULATION 
The purpose of this study was to determine whether unlawful 
campaigning has a greater effect on voters than does lawful 
campaigning. For, if it does not, there is little value in the NLRB's 
16. Goetz & Wike, Book Review, 25 KAN. L. REV. 375 (1977). 
17. Miller, The Getman, Goldberg and Herman Questions, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1976). 
18. Eames, An Analysis of the Union Voting Study From a Trade-Unionist's Point of View, 
28 STAN. L. REV. I 181 (1976). 
19. Flanagan, The Behavioral Foundations of Union Election Regulation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 
I 195 (1976). 
20. Kochan, Legal Nonsense, Empirical Examination and Pqlicy Evaluation, 29 STAN. L. 
REV. 1115 (1977). 
21. Raskin, JJeregulation of Union Campaigns: Restoring the First Amendment Balance, 28 
STAN. L. REV. 1175 (1976). 
22. See, e.g., Carnes, Book Review, 31 ARK. L. REV. 165 (1977); Cravert, Book Review, 22 
V!LL. L. REV. 891 (1977); Lopatka, Book Review, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 420 (1978); Martin, Book 
Review, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 501 (1977); Modjeska, Book Review, 26 CATH. U. L. REV. 633 
(1977); Peck, Book Review, 53 U. WASH. L. REV. 197 (1977); Roomkin, Book Review, 27 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 1056 (1977); Shapiro, Why JJo Voters Vote?, 86 YALE L.J. 1532 (1977). 
See also Ross, Afterthoughts on the Short-Lived Experiment in JJeregulalion of Representa-
tion Elections, 77 MICH. L. REV. 560 (1979); Goussetis, Misrepresentations in Union Elections: 
The Death of Hollywood Ceramics, 9 U. ToL. L. REV. 399 (1978); Sindelar, Shopping Karl: The 
Need for a Broader Approach lo the Problems of Campaign Regulation, 56 N.C. L. REV. 389 
(1978); Phelan, The JJemise of Hollywood Ceramics, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 450 (1977). 
23. Krislov, Book Review, 3 INDUS. LAB. REL. REV. 111 (1977); Staudohar, Book Review, 
30 PERSONNEL PSYCH. 485 (1977); Strauss, Bridging the Gap Between Law and Psychology: A 
First Bui JJ!ffecull Step, 22 CONTEMP. PSYCH. 833 (1977). 
24. See Jacobs, NLRB Licenses Lying, The Nation, Sept. 3, 1977, at 176; Merry, Labor 
Law and Union Organizing, Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 1978, at 24, col. 4; JJo Representation Elections 
Need the NLRB?, Bus. Week, Mar. 21, 1977, at 54. 
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maintaining a regulatory system designed to separate lawful from 
unlawful campaigning. Consistent with that purpose, we sought to 
measure the impact of campaigning that is unlawful under the pres-
ent regulatory scheme. 
Most unlawful campaigning consists of efforts by an employer to 
capitalize on its economic control over employees through threats 
and acts of reprisal, and promises and grants of benefit. Accord-
ingly, the study was designed primarily to test for the effects of that 
type of unlawful campaigning. The Board does not, however, limit 
its campaign regulation to those tactics; it also bars, as "objectiona-
ble" under section 9, if not an unfair labor practice under section 8, 
any campaign practice that it believes will tend to interfere with a 
reasoned choice, such as a misrepresentation of fact or law,25 an ir-
relevant and inflammatory appeal to racial prejudice,26 or a last-
minute campaign speech. :p These practices are barred because the 
Board assumes that employees pay close attention to the contents of 
campaign propaganda, and, wholly apart from any element of coer-
cion, are easily manipulated by such propaganda.28 Another pur-
pose of the study, then, was to determine the extent to which 
employees do attend closely to the contents of campaign propa-
ganda, and the extent to which they are influenced by that propa-
ganda. 
Because we were interested in determining the effect of unlawful 
campaigning, we studied those elections in which we predicted that 
such campaigning might occur.29 Our prediction of the likelihood of 
unlawful campaigning was reasonably accurate. Of the thirty-one 
elections studied, the employer committed unfair labor practices in 
twenty-two, nine of which were serious enough to warrant a bargain-
ing order. 
In each election chosen for study, a sample of employees was 
interviewed as soon as possible after the direction of election or con-
25. See General Knit of Cal., Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978). 
26. See Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962). 
27. See Peerless Plywood Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953). 
28. See Law and Reality at 2-4. "The Board has said that in election proceedings it seeks 
'to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly 
ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees.' Where for any reason 
the standard falls too low the Board will set aside the election and direct a new one.'' Sewell 
Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 69-70 (1962). 
29. This prediction was based upon the following criteria: (1) the strength of the em-
ployer's opposition to unionization; (2) whether the law firm representing the employer had a 
reputation for representing employer~ who campaigned strongly and sometimes unlawfully; 
(3) whether the employer had engaged in unlawful practices in prior elections; (4) whether the 
employer appeared willing to abide by counsel's advice in conducting the campaign; (5) the 
views of employer and union representatives as to the likely nature of the campaign. 
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sent election agreement. In this interview, employees were asked a 
number of questions, including how they intended to vote. A second 
interview with the same employees was held immediately after the 
election. At this interview, employees were asked a number of ques-
tions about the content of the campaign. They were also asked how 
they had voted. After interviewing the employees, we interviewed 
those representatives of the employer and the union who had been in 
charge of the election campaign. The primary purpose of this inter-
view was to determine the content of the campaign. 
As a result of these interviews, we knew what had taken place in 
the campaign. We knew what parts of the campaign had made an 
impression on employees, and what parts had not - what they 
remembered of the campaign, and what they did not. Finally, we 
knew-which employees voted as they had intended prior to the cam-
paign, and which had not. Thus, we were in a position to study the 
relationship between voter intent, different types of campaigning, 
and actual vote. 
Our findings, summarized briefly, were these: Most employees, 
as a result of their views about working conditions and their atti-
tudes toward unions, form an early and stable voting intention. 
Ninety percent of the employees we interviewed had a firm intent to 
vote for or against union representation at the time the election was 
directed, and only six percent were undecided. Of those who had a 
firm intent, eighty-seven percent voted in accordance with that in-
tent, despite vigorous, frequently unlawful campaigning in nearly 
every election. For the great majority of employees, then, the effect 
of the campaign, if any, must be to cause them to vote consistent 
with their original intent. 
There was no evidence that unlawful threats and acts of reprisal 
(hereinafter reprisals), or promises and grants of benefit (hereinafter 
benefits) had a greater effect on vote than did lawful campaigning. 
While the union tended to lose support between the time the election 
was directed and the time it was held, that loss was not significantly 
greater when the employer's campaigning contained unlawful bene-
fits or reprisals than when it did not. Furthermore, those potential 
union supporters who did switch and vote against the union were not 
significantly more likely to report unlawful benefits or reprisals than 
were those who voted for the union. 
Our explanation for the apparent lack of differential impact be-
tween lawful and unlawful campaigning is two-fold. First, employ-
ees do not draw the same distinctions between lawful and unlawful 
campaigning that the Board does. Employees reported unlawful 
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benefits and reprisals in all elections, and the frequency of such re-
ports was not related to a Board finding that such conduct had oc-
curred. Second, those employees who were initial union supporters 
appear to have been prepared for, and to have discounted, the em-
ployer's recourse to his economic power over them. Threats and acts 
of reir.sal simply confirmed their belief in the necessity of union 
protection; promises and grants of benefit were regarded as untrust-
worthy or inadequate. 
Because there were some elections in which the employer utilized 
unlawful benefits and reprisals, and others in which it did not, we 
have direct evidence of the lack of differential impact of this type of 
unlawful campaigning compared to that of lawful campaigning. 
And, since unlawful benefits and reprisals had no greater effect on 
voting than did lawful campaigning, we concluded that there is no 
justification for Board regulation designed to separate the lawful 
from the unlawful. 
The evidence as to the effect of objectionable, albeit not unfair 
labor practice, campaigning is less direct. There were no elections in 
which either party used racial campaigning, made last-minute 
speeches, or engaged in any of the other campaign practices pro-
scribed under the "laboratory conditions" concept of General Shoe. 
Nor was it practicable to examine the campaigns for misrepresenta-
tions of the type proscribed by Hollywood Ceramics and General 
Knit. In brief, then, we could not compare elections in which there 
was a violation of "laboratory conditions" short of a section 8(a)(l) 
violation with those in which there was no violation of "laboratory 
conditions," and conclude, on the basis of such a comparison, that 
currently objectionable campaigning has no greater impact than that 
campaigning that is not objectionable. 
Nonetheless, we conclude that currently objectionable campaign-
ing is so unlikely to have a greater impact than unobjectionable 
campaigning that retaining the existing regulatory scheme for the 
sole purpose of ferreting out objectionable campaigning is unwar-
ranted. This conclusion rests on the following analysis: The view 
that campaigning other than unlawful benefits and reprisals may in-
terfere with free choice is based on the assumption that employee 
choice is fragile, and easily altered by campaign propaganda, con-
trary to the employee's true wishes. This view also rests, particularly 
to the extent that misrepresentations of fact or law are regulated, on 
the assumption that employees pay careful attention to the contents 
of campaign propaganda. If they do not, they would be unaffected 
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by misrepresentations, and there would be little point in barring such 
misrepresentations. 
Neither of these assumptions is supported by the data. Employee 
choice, as has already been pointed out, is made early in the cam-
paign, is firmly rooted in pre-campaign attitudes, and is not altered 
by subsequent campaigning. Part of the reason for this lack of effect 
is that once employees have decided to vote for one party, they ap-
pear to reject, as unworthy of belief, the campaign propaganda of the 
other. If this disbelief is sufficiently powerful to cancel out unlawful 
benefits and reprisals, as it appears to be, there is every reason to 
suppose that it will also cancel out less intrusive elements of the cam-
paign. 
This conclusion is further buttressed by the evidence that em-
ployees do not pay careful attention to the contents· of campaign 
propaganda. Only two to three issues per campaign were 
remembered at all,30 and fewer than twenty-five percent of the em-
ployees could recall with any accuracy such a central issue as the 
amount of wages the union claimed to have obtained for employees 
it represented elsewhere.31 
Finally, there was no evidence that those employees who 
switched from an undecided or union intent to a company vote were 
influenced by the content of the company campaign. There was evi-
dence that those employees who switched in the other direction -
from an undecided or company intent to a union vote - may have 
been influenced by the content of the union campaign, but the 
number of employees in this category was miniscule (forty-three em-
ployees switching to the union out of a total of 1057). 
For all of these reasons, we concluded that the likelihood that the 
content of campaign propaganda substantially affects vote is so slim 
that its regulation cannot be justified, either on the ground that such 
propaganda will coerce employees into voting contrary to their free 
will, or that it will so confuse or mislead them that they will be un-
able to make a reasoned choice. 
One further finding must be set out to understand fully our pack-
age of recommendations. While familiarity with the content of both 
company and union campaigns was low for most employees, there 
was a strong and significant relationship between attendance at 
meetings and campaign familiarity. Employees who attended com-
pany meetings were significantly more familiar with the company 
30. Law and Reality at 74-76. 
31. Id at 82. 
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campaign than were employees who did not; employees who at-
tended union meetings were significantly more familiar with the 
union campaign than were employees who did not. However, a far 
higher proportion (83%) of employees attended company meetings 
than union meetings (36%). Furthermore, most of those employees 
attending union meetings were already union supporters, while com-
pany meetings were attended by the undecided and union supporters 
as well as by company supporters. The union, then, was at a disad-
vantage in communicating with the undecided and those not already 
committed to it. There was, moreover, evidence that attendance at 
union meetings was associated with switching from an undecided in-
tent, or even a company intent, to a union vote. This switch was 
associated with increased familiarity with the content of the union 
campaign. 32 
In order to assure the union an equal opportunity to present its 
views to the voters - particularly the undecided and those initially 
planning to vote against union representation - we recommended 
that whenever an employer holds campaign meetings on working 
time and premises, that employer should be required to allow the 
union to hold such meetings on working time and premises. We also 
noted: 
An opportunity for unions to respond on company premises to anti-
union campaigning on those premises is particularly important if the 
Board, as we recommend, is to cease regulating speech. [The absence 
of] [c]ampaign regulation in political elections is based on the assump-
tion that each party will be able to point out to the voters those aspects 
of the other party's campaign it believes to be untruthful or unfair. 
Unions will have that ability only if they have the opportunity to cam-
paign on equal terms with the employer on company premises.33 
Finally, we recommended that the existing scheme of Board reg-
ulation be altered to provide stronger sanctions against retaliation 
for union activity, and to deter employers from engaging in those 
practices that may discourage many employees from ever giving seri-
ous consideration to exercising their section 7 right to organize. 
Thus, we suggested that the Board impose on employers the bur-
den of proving the absence of discriminatory motive for any dis-
charge during a union organizing campaign, that the Board institute 
immediate injunctive proceedings to obtain reinstatement of any em-
32. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently relied upon this 
finding in sustaining the Board's authority, in appropriate circumstances, to grant a union 
broad rights of access to company premises. See United1Steelworkers v. NLRB, 106 L.R.R.M. · 
2573, 2579 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
33. Law and Reality at 157. 
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ployee discharged during this period, and that any employee dis-
criminatorily discharged be reinstated with treble back pay. We 
suggested that the bargaining order, if retained, be triggered auto-
matically by the conduct it is intended to deter, without the necessity 
of a Board finding that that conduct has made a fair election unlikely 
or impossible. We also suggested that persistent violators of the Act 
might be declared ineligible for government contracts.34 
While each of these recommendations is capable of being evalu-
ated and implemented independently of the others, they are best 
viewed as an integrated package, capable of being substituted, in 
toto, for the existing regulatory scheme. In place of direct govern-
ment regulation of speech, which is based on invalid assumptions 
and results in extensive litigation, we proposed that: (1) speech be 
wholly free of government regulation; (2) unions be given the op-
portunity, through equal access to employees, to respond in their 
own fashion to employer speech; and (3) meaningful sanctions be 
imposed to deter the coercive use of employer economic power. 
II. THE LABOR BOARD'S RESPONSE TO LAW AND REALITY 
Harvard University President Derek C. Bok, in his foreword to 
Law and Reality, speculated on the Board's response to the study. 
He stated: 
[O]ne must recognize at the outset that the Board is singularly ill-
equipped to evaluate the study. Neither the members of the Board nor 
its staff are social scientists, and the research unit established in the 
early years of the NLRB was long ago dismantled by Congress as a 
result of repeated charges that it was infested by persons of Communist 
persuasion. . . . [T]he present study must be received by a Board that 
is poorly prepared to evaluate its findings and ill-disposed at this late 
date to accept a body of conclusions that calls in question a whole 
multitude of rules that have been in force for many years.35 
Unfortunately, President Bok's fears were well founded. We had 
hoped that by collecting and reporting data on how employees actu-
ally respond to employer and union campaigning we would succeed 
in raising the level of the debate about campaign regulation from the 
trading of unverified assumptions and rhetoric to a serious search for 
a rational regulatory scheme. At least, we had hoped to stimulate 
34. These particular suggestions for strengthening the Board's power to remedy and deter 
coercive conduct were not intended to preclude other remedies that would accomplish that 
goal. Thus, we also favor the proposals in the Senate and House~sions of the Labor Law 
Reform Act to make employees whole for losses sustained by them as-a-result of an employer's 
unlawful refusal to bargain. See H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(3) (1977); S. 2467, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess., § 8(3)(a) (1978). 
35. Law and Reality at xii. 
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the collection of still further data on which a rational regulatory 
scheme could be based. Neither of these hopes has been fulfilled. 
Board members continue to parade their assumptions as fact, and no 
effort has been made by the Board to collect any additional data that 
would shed light on the validity of those assumptions. 
A majority of the board did, as has been noted, refer to the study 
in Shopping Kart, but, wholly apart from the prompt overruling of 
Shopping Kart, the Board's treatment of the study in that case did 
little to improve the quality of the debate. As Professor Shapiro 
pointed out: 
With all respect, it seems to me that whatever position one may take 
on the merits, it is hard to view the Board's approach in the Shopping 
Kart case as anything but misguided. On the one hand, the majority 
simply referred to the study without any consideration of its strengths 
and weaknesses; the dissenters, on the other hand, tried only to score 
debaters' points against it without any pretense at objectivity. . .. 
Since it dealt with one of the less important rules governing campaign 
practices, Shopping Kart was not in any event the best vehicle for con-
sidering the study's significance, and simply led to an unexplained af-
firmation of other existing rules - an affirmation justly called in 
question by the dissent. And the dissenters, while defending their own 
assumptions about what may influence a voter's decision, made only a 
halting attempt to support the Hollywood Ceramics rule on grounds 
quite unrelated to those assumptions.36 
Furthermore, both Shopping Kart and its successor, General Knit, 
dealt with only one of the study's recommendations, rather than ex-
amining the recommendations as an integrated whole. Finally, in 
neither case did the Board make an effort, in view of its own lack of 
social science expertise, to subject the study to a broader range of 
criticism, either by utilizing its rule making powers, or by calling for 
amicus briefs from interested groups. Instead, the study was debated 
by the Board within the confines of its normal adjudicatory ap-
proach. 
The result of the Board's lack of social science expertise, its fail-
ure to seek the assistance of experts, and the obvious hostility of 
some Board members to a study that challenged the very founda-
tion of a large part of their work, is that both its criticisms of the 
study and its approach to the misrepresentation issue are, on the 
whole, pedestrian. Initially, both the Fanning-Jenkins dissent in 
Shopping Kart, and their majority opinion (with Member Truesdale) 
in General Knit contain erroneous factual assertions about the 
study's methodology and findings. In Shopping Kart, they state that 
36. Shapiro, supra note 22, at 1543. 
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precampaign voting intent was determined after the election, 37 at 
which point it might have been affected by the election outcome; in 
fact, voting intent was determined before the election. 38 They state 
that five percent of the voters "appear to have admitted changing 
their minds due to the campaign";39 there were, in fact, no such ad-
missions. Finally, they state, in General Knit, that "this study indi-
cates [that] a substantial minority of employees are influenced by the 
campaign";40 there was no such indication. 
Other portions of the Fanning-Jenkins-Truesdale opinions state 
the data correctly, but indicate that they did not understand the data. 
For example, they say in General Knit that Member John Penello 
erred because "he discounts the study's recognition that the mere 
existence of an employer campaign may have influenced employees, 
on the grounds that the influence was not from any factual asser-
tions. Yet how could the employer's campaign have been free of 
factual assertions?"41 
The answer to this question is clear, and was spelled out in Law 
and Reality. Of course, the employer's campaign is not free of fac-
tual assertions. The point, however, is that while the employer's op-
position to unionization, as evidenced by its mounting a campaign 
against the union, may influence some employees to vote against 
union representation, there is no evidence that the factual assertions 
made by the employer during that campaign contribute to whatever 
influence the campaign may have. 
The General Knit majority made another statement, also based 
on the data, which requires some unravelling to reveal its analytic 
flaw. They state, again taking issue with Member Penello, that: . 
He asserts that the study's findings did not support a conclusion that 19 
percent of the voters were affected by the campaign information, but 
rather that, at most, the 5 percent who ultimately voted for the union 
were affected. His position, in contrast to our view, gives little weight 
to the study's observation that those who voted for the union had 
greater exposure to the union's campaign information than did those 
who voted against the union - a finding which suggests that if the 
others had similar exposure, they, too, might have voted for the 
union.42 
The Board majority apparently is referring to our finding that 
37. 228 N.L.R.B. at 1315. 
38. Law and Reality at 33. 
39. 228 N.L.R.B. at 1315-16. 
40. 239 N.L.R.B. at 622. 
41. 239 N.L.R.B. at 622 n.24. 
42. 239 N.L.R.B. at 622 n.24. 
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among the undecided and those who intended to vote against union 
representation, those who attended union meetings were more likely 
to vote for the union than were those who did not attend such meet-
ings. There was also a strong relationship between attending union 
meetings and familiarity with the union campaign. Hence, the ma-
jority appears to conclude, if more of the undecided and those plan-
ning to vote for the union had attended union meetings, they, too, 
might have acquired more familiarity with the union campaign and 
voted for the union. Since more of the undecided and those plan-
ning to vote against union representation might, on occasion, attend 
union meetings and so become familiar with the union campaign, 
the Board is justified in regulating that campaign. 
The flaw in this analysis is that unions have been able to attract 
to their meetings only a small proportion (36%) of the undecided, 
and an even smaller proportion (16%) of those intending to vote 
against union representation.43 Nor is there any reason to suppose 
that unions will be more successful in this respect in the future - at 
least not without the Board's assistance. The Board, however, has 
declined to compel employers to allow union meetings on the em-
ployer's premises during working hours, when more employees 
would attend. Under these circumstances, for the Board to justify 
regulation of the union campaign on the ground that more employ-
ees might attend union meetings, and so acquire meaningful expo-
sure to the union campaign, is the nicest form of Catch 22 reasoning. 
The failure of the study to alter the Board's approach to ques-
tions of employee behavior is also evident in the Board's repetition 
of the same type of rhetoric that triggered the study. Thus, Fanning 
and Jenkins state in Shopping Kart that "the ballot can be directly 
and significantly affected by the campaign propaganda of the em-
ployer and the union."44 No factual basis is provided for this asser-
tion, other than the following statement from General Knit: 
The results of forty-three years of conducting elections, investigating 
objections, and holding hearings at which employees testify concerning 
their recollection of campaign tactics convince us that employees are 
influenced by certain union and employer campaign statements.45 
One might respond to this statement by pointing out that: (1) 
Board members do not normally conduct elections, investigate ob-
jections, or hold hearings at which employees testify; (2) the Board's 
regional personnel do perform those functions, but they were not in-
43. Law and Reality at 104-06. 
44. 228 N.L.R.B. at 1317. 
45. 239 N.L.R.B. at 622. 
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volved in the overruling of Shopping Kart; and (3) although it is dif-
ficult to understand how the regional office personnel who do 
perform these functions can be convinced of the effect of particular 
campaign statements on employee choice, even if they can, the only 
current Board member with regional office experience, John Penello, 
voted against overruling Shopping Kart. Perhaps a more satisfactory 
and surely a more literate response to the Board's approach was that 
of Professor Kochan, who wrote: "[I]n a 1935 essay on 'The Nature 
of Legal Nonsense' Felix Cohen . . . drew an analogy between this 
approach and the notion of the Bellman in Lewis Carroll's The Hunt-
ing of the Snark, stating that courts and administrative agencies 
seem to operate on the theory that if they cite some argument or 
principle often enough it must be true."46 
The Board also set out some new assumptions in Shopping Kart 
and General Knit, assumptions no less intriguing for their substance 
than for their novelty. Fanning and Jenkins state in Shopping Kart 
that the lack of objections in ninety-five percent of Board elections 
shows that the Board's rules regarding campaigning are nearly al-
ways followed.47 A failure to object, however, can be attributed to a 
host of factors other than the absence of objectionable conduct. 
There may be no objections because it was the loser, not the winner, 
who violated the Board's rules, in which event there would be no 
point in filing objections. Even if the winner violated the rules, the 
loser may not know of the objectionable conduct, or may not know 
that the Board would regard it as objectionable. Finally, the loser 
may believe that the margin by which it lost was too great to expect 
victory in a re-run election. In each of these situations no objections 
would have been filed, but one could not say, as the Board did, that 
its rules deterred the conduct it regards as objectionable. 
Not as demonstrably wrong, but perhaps more startling, is the 
Fanning-Jenkins assertion in Shopping Kart that: 
We think it can fairly be said that the high degree of voter participa-
tion in our elections is encouraged by the longstanding policy that 
Hollywood Ceramics represents and, indeed, that voters in political 
46. Kochan, supra note 20, at 1115 (footnotes omitted). Lewis Carrol has written: 
"Just the place for a Snark," the bellman cried, 
As he landed his crew with care; 
Supporting each man on the top of the tide 
By a finger entwined in his hair. 
"Just the place for a Snark." I have said it twice: 
That alone should encourage the crew. 
"Just the place for a Snark." I have said it thrice: 
What I tell you three times is true. 
L. CARROLL, The Hunting of the Snark, in COMPLETE WORKS 680 (1939). 
47. 228 N.L.R.B. at 1316. 
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elections may refrain from voting to the extent they do partly because 
they are reluctant or unable to rely on the representations made where 
there is no satisfactory method of review of campaign conduct. The 
very fact of high voter participation in Board elections counsels the 
continuance of Board effort in the area of informed free will voting.48 
The Board's view that the higher rate of voter participation in NLRB 
elections than in political elections is due, even in part, to the ab-
sence of governmental regulation of campaign propaganda in polit-
ical elections is supported by neither political theory nor empirical 
evidence. A more likely explanation for the higher voting rate in 
Board elections than in political elections is, quite simply, the greater 
ease in getting to the polls in Board elections, which are nearly al-
ways held on company premises during working hours with paid 
time off to vote.49 
Finally, the Board states in General Knit that: 
Even if this particular study were clearly supportive of all of the 
authors' conclusions, however, we would still not find it an adequate 
ground for rejecting a rule which had been well established for 15 
years. While we welcome research from the behavioral sciences, 1 
study of only 31 elections in 1 area of the country - although it may 
provide food for thought - is simply not sufficient to disprove the as-
sumptions upon which the Board has regulated election conduct, espe-
cially since, in our experience, statements made b[y] either side can 
significantly affect voter preference.50 
If our study has given the Board food for thought, there is no evi-
dence of digestion. Not only has the Board ignored the study in sub-
sequent opinions, but it continues to apply, without debate or a hint 
of self-doubt, the very assumptions challenged by the study.51 
Surely, the study merits more recognition than is implied by the 
Board's current effort to pretend that it does not exist. Despite the 
Board's pious assertion that it welcomes research from the behav-
ioral sciences, its approach neither encourages others to engage in 
such research, nor takes advantage of whatever insights may be sug-
gested by this research. 
Equally disturbing is the reluctance of some Board members to 
utilize our study simply because they find its conclusions inconsistent 
with their view that some speech should be unlawful. Thus, the dis-
48. 228 N.L.R.B. at 1317. 
49. Perhaps even more significant than the unlikely nature of this assumption is the evi-
dence it provides of the Board's tendency to support its regulation by relying, in the total 
absence of empirical support, on the most extraordinary behavioral assumptions. 
50. 239 N.L.R.B. at 622. 
51. See Wilker Bros., 236 N.L.R.B. 1371, 98 L.R.R.M. 1456 (1978); Durango Boot, 247 
N.L.R.B. No. 46, 103 L.R.R.M. 1171 (Jan. 3, 1980); Louis Gallet, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 
103 L.R.R.M. 1125 (Jan. 3, 1980). 
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senters in Shopping Kart attacked the majority's reliance on our find-
ings in part because, regardless of the validity of the findings, their 
acceptance would logically lead to a more extensive de-regulation of 
speech.52 Similarly, Member Truesdale, explaining his vote in Gen-
eral Knit, stated that he was "disturbed . . . by the direction in 
which Board decisions would go if the Board were to rely completely 
on the conclusions the authors drew from their data."53 In short, the 
study is to be ignored because to do otherwise would force the Board 
to confront the lack of any empirical foundation for its regulation of 
speech. 
How should the Board deal with this study? One approach, sug-
gested by several reviewers, would be to conduct a rulemaking pro-
ceeding to reconsider the Board's election policies in toto, as well as 
the relevance of the study to those policies. Such a proceeding 
would be open to all interested persons, so that the Board could ben-
efit by the comments of social scientists, lawyers, and legal scholars 
on the study's methodology, findings, and recommendations. This 
discussion need not be addressed to the facts of any particular case, 
and would not be limited by the rules of evidence applicable to a 
judicial proceeding.54 Furthermore, as a perceptive student com-
mentator noted: 
A rulemaking approach would also have enabled the Board to con-
sider each facet of its election controls within the context of a compre-
hensive and complementary regulatory scheme. Comprehensive policy 
examination of this nature is impelled by the Getman study and by the 
fact that the Board's regulation of other campaign practices has pro-
duced many of the same problems as its now-discarded controls over 
misrepresentations. Moreover, the Board's policies in various areas of 
campaign regulation are intimately connected and therefore should be 
considered together. For example, the policy of providing unions lim-
ited access to employer premises serves a goal similar to that of the 
Board's regulation of campaign misconduct: both policies have as 
their overriding purpose the effectuation of a free and informed voter 
choice. Abandonment of controls over misrepresentations might have 
been more justifiable had the Board concurrently taken positive action 
to provide unions with equal access to employer premises - a step 
supported both by considerations of fairness and by the desirability of 
maximizing the opportunity to rebut misinformation. Significantly, in 
Shopping Kart the Board ignored the fact that the Getman study's rec-
ommendations with regard to deregulation were made in the context of 
other proposals advocating equal access to company premises and 
52. 228 N.L.R.B. at 1318. 
53. Truesdale, From General Shoe lo General Knit, 30 LAB. L.J. 67, 74 (1979). 
54. Shapiro, supra note 22, at 1545. See Peck, supra note 22, at 198, 213. 
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stronger remedies for other types of campaign misconduct.55 
Since the Board viewed the study as too limited in scope to be 
relied upon ("one study of only 31 elections in one area of the coun-
try . . . is simply not sufficient"), it should take steps to increase the 
data available to it. One way in which this might be accomplished 
would be through the creation of an empirical research unit within 
the Board.56 Alternatively, the Board could commission studies by 
independent researchers - if necessary, requesting additional fund-
ing from Congress to carry out such studies. The Board could also 
support the efforts of qualified researchers to obtain funding from 
other agencies, public and private, to support research that would be 
useful to the Board in resolving important policy questions. 
The Board should carefully evaluate all studies that supplement 
the limited body of data bearing on the behavioral assumptions that 
underlie its regulations. Behavioral evidence is not inherently more 
compelling than the testimonial or documentary evidence that the 
Board is accustomed to dealing with, but neither is it inherently less 
compelling. Just as the Board carefully evaluates the latter evidence, 
so should it carefully evaluate the former.57 
Ill. THE ACADEMIC CRITICS' RESPONSES TO LAW AN.D REALITY 
The academic critics, in contrast to the Board, have treated this 
research seriously. While there were comments on nearly every as-
pect of the research, the most frequent criticism was that the study's 
findings were the product of a flawed sample of elections. If, it was 
suggested, we had used different criteria for selecting elections to 
study, we might have found campaigning in general, or particular 
types of campaigning, to have had a greater impact.58 
The broadest version of this criticism was that there were so few 
elections in which vigorous campaigning did not take place that we 
were unable to determine whether campaigning per se had an effect 
on vote. 59 This criticism is based on a misunderstanding of the 
study's purpose. It was not our purpose to determine whether 
campaigning per se has an effect on vote, and one cannot conclude 
55. Note, 56 N.C. L. REV. 289, 405-06 (1978) (footnotes omitted). 
56. See Roomkin & Abrams, Using Behavioral Evidence in NLRB Regulation: A Proposal, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 1441, 1459 (1977). 
57. The Board would be greatly assisted in carrying out this task by the creation of the type 
of empirical research unit proposed by Professors Roomkin and Abrams. Id. 
58. See Eames, supra note 18, at 1182; Kochan, supra note 20, at 1119-20; Peck, supra note 
22, at 206-08; Shapiro, supra note 22, at 1535-36, 1538. 
59. See Shapiro, supra note 22, at 1535-36, 1538. 
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from the data we collected that it does not. What one can conclude, 
however, is that the content of the campaign - what the parties say 
and do - does not have a significant effect on vote. It is, of course, 
the content of the campaign that the Board regulates, not its exist-
ence. The Board does not decide whether a party may campaign, 
but what it may lawfully say and do in the course of that campaign. 
And, because we can find no evidence that unlawful campaigning 
has a significantly greater impact on voting than does lawful 
campaigning, we conclude that there is little value in the Board's 
efforts to distinguish between the two. 
Another criticism of the sampling of elections was set out by Pro-
fessor Eames. She stated: 
My threshold problem is that I believe that the authors have made 
a fundamental error in performing a study exclusively of "hotly-con-
tested" cases ''with a high potential for illegal behavior." If one wants 
to study the impact of coercion, of unfair labor practices, on the pro-
cess of employee choice, it is absolutely essential to have a control 
group of employees who are not subjected to coercion and unfair labor 
practices. 60 
This statement is somewhat confusing because it suggests that Pro-
fessor Eames believes that all the elections we studied were charac-
terized by "coercion and unfair labor practices," i.e., unlawful 
campaigning. In fact, there was a control group of elections in which 
no illegal campaigning took place, and Professor Eames recognizes 
this. The gravamen of her criticism is that in all elections the em-
ployer made statements that were perceived by some employees as 
constituting unlawful threats or promises, even though the Board, 
under current law, would not find those statements to be unlawful. 
She characterizes the employees in those elections as "subject to co-
ercion," and concludes that the study provides no data indicating 
how employees would act in the absence of such "coercion." To an-
swer that question, she calls for a different study - one with a con-
trol group of elections in which no employee will perceive the 
employer's conduct as containing unlawful threats or promises. 
It is doubtful whether the study that Professor Eames proposes 
could be carried out. The data indicate that some employees will 
perceive unlawful threats or promises whenever the employer makes 
predictions about the future of the enterprise with or without a 
union. Since it is difficult to imagine a campaign in which the em-
ployer makes no such predictions, it may be impossible to find elec-
60. Eames, supra note 18, at 1182. 
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tions in which the employer does not behave "coercively" in the 
sense in which Professor Eames uses that term. 
Let us assume, however, that one could carry out the study that 
Professor Eames proposes, and that one were to find, as she obvi-
ously anticipates, that whenever an employer makes statements that 
could be interpreted as unlawful threats or promises, some employ-
ees who would or might otherwise vote for union representation will 
switch to a vote against the union.61 What would be the implications 
of such a finding? If any employer statement that predicts a bright 
future in the absence of a union, or a grim future with a union, "co-
erces" employees into voting against union representation, and if one 
views "coercion" of this type to be undesirable, there would appear 
two possible alternatives. The first alternative would be to forbid the 
employer from making any statement, however phrased, that casts 
doubt on the value of unionization. The second alternative would be 
to minimize the opportunity for such statements by providing for 
certification on the basis of union authorization cards. For, if a 
union with a majority of authorization cards were entitled to certifi-
cation, many unions would organize secretly, in the hope that the 
employer would be unaware of their organizing efforts and unlikely 
to discuss the value of unionization while these efforts were taking 
place. 
Neither of these alternatives is satisfactory. The first - an offi-
cial ban on employer speech critical of unionization - has been held 
unconstitutional. 62 The second - union certification on the basis of 
a card majority - might, as a practical matter, prevent the employer 
from being heard, and so would be contrary to the value that each 
party should have a reasonable opportunity to present its case to the 
voters. An employer is unlikely to accept the election process as le-
gitimate, and its outcome as a valid representation of employee 
choice, if it has not had an opportunity to communicate the manage-
ment position to the employees. The policy of encouraging peaceful 
acceptance of the results of Board elections thus counsels against de-
nying the employer this opportunity. 
Denial of this opportunity to the employer would also be con-
trary to the employee interest in freedom of choice. Not many of the 
employees may be influenced by the specific content of the em-
ployer's campaign, but the campaign may have some effect. The em-
ployer campaign may affect choice by activating or reinforcing 
61. Professor Eames believes that our data support precisely this finding. Id. at 1191. We 
disagree. See text at notes 29-31 supra. 
62. NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941). 
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existing attitudes toward working conditions or toward unions. It 
also may demonstrate that the employer is aware of the dissatisfac-
tion that led to the union organizing drive. Thus, the employer's 
campaign may promote a more considered, if not more informed, 
choice. This possibility supports the conclusion that the employer 
ought not be denied a reasonable opportunity to communicate with 
employees after the union organizing drive has resulted in a card 
majority. 
In sum, we disagree with the assertion that we should have at-
tempted to study the effect of "coercive" versus "non-coercive" cam-
paigns, rather than the effect of "lawful" versus "unlawful" 
campaigns. The former study may not be feasible, and could not 
yield useful data; the latter is feasible, and provides a data base for 
determining whether unlawful campaigns have a greater effect on 
vote than lawful campaigns. For, if they do not (as our data show), 
there is little value to devoting time and money to the task of at-
tempting to distinguish lawful from unlawful campaigning. 
Another criticism of our sampling procedure was that: 
The indicators which the authors used to identify companies as likely 
to engage in vigorous campaigning63 were probably also known to the 
employees of those companies, who were thereby sensitized to 
problems of unionization. The "card signing drive" necessarily in-
volved a substantial amount of personal contact (which the authors 
found to be a particularly effective campaign tactic for both sides). 
This could have shaped and rigidified the pro-union attitudes of the 
employees with a result that later overt and public campaigning had 
little effect on the predispositions existing at the time of the Wave I 
interviews. Those employees who had been intimidated or coerced by 
the known hostility of the employer might already have succumbed to 
that pressure, resolving the problem of the cognitive dissonance be-
tween their view of themselves as persons of integrity and indepen-
dence and their fear of employer reprisals by concluding that they were 
in basic and fundamental agreement with the employer. For these em-
ployees, the subsequent pre-election campaign accordingly would be of 
little importance. Those persons who successfully resisted the em-
ployer's pressure remained true to their convictions, and the campaign-
ing would likewise be of little significance. 
This analysis suggests that the study might be valid only for employers 
whose prior conduct suggests the likelihood of vigorous and possibly. 
unlawful campaigning.64 
This criticism assumes that pre-campaign indications by the em-
ployer that it will engage in vigorous and possibly unlawful 
63. See note 29 supra (footnote added). 
64. Peck, supra note 22, at 207-08. 
584 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 79:564 
campaigning may be necessary to create powerful attitudes for or 
against union representation, and to weed out, prior to the com-
mencement of actual campaigning, those employees who fear the 
employer's use of its economic power. We think that this assump-
tion is invalid, and that the existence of strong attitudes toward 
unionization, as well as the pre-campaign weeding out of employees 
susceptible to coercion, are general phenomena that are not lim-
ited to the employees of those employers whose prior conduct sug-
gests the likelihood of vigorous, possibly unlawful campaigning. 
Well-developed attitudes toward unionization exist before any 
union organizing effort occurs, and before any indications of the em-
ployer's likely response to such an effort. In a recent nationwide 
study, ninety-five percent of the employees in nonunion firms that 
were not the current object of a union organizing effort had an opin-
ion about whether they would vote for or against union representa-
tion if a representation election were held in their firm. 65 Since such 
opinions are a function of employee attitudes toward working condi-
tions and their views of unions in general, and since those attitudes 
develop over an employee's entire working career, it is likely that 
they are generally strong, and not easily susceptible to change re-
gardless of whether or not vigorous campaigning is anticipated. 
Furthermore, the card signing drive - which preceded the first 
wave of interviews in the elections we studied, and which Professor 
Peck suggests could have played a role in shaping and rigidifying 
employee attitudes - precedes every election, not merely those in 
which vigorous and possibly unlawful campaigning is anticipated. 
In this respect, too, there is no reason to suppose that the existence of 
well-developed attitudes is limited to those elections in which a vig-
orous, possibly unlawful, campaign is anticipated. 
Nor is there any reason to suppose that employees are not gener-
ally aware that their employer may be opposed to unionization and 
may use, or threaten to use, economic force to discourage unioniza-
tion. It is common knowledge that many employers are opposed to 
unionization, and that some employers have resorted to economic 
force to prevent unionization.66 Hence, the employees of any em-
65. Kochan, How American Workers View Labor Unions, 102 MONTHLY LAB, REV,, Apr. 
1979, at 23, 25. Of the 1038 respondents employed in nonunion firms, 28.4 percent (295) indi-
cated they would vote for unionization, 66.2 percent (688) indicated they would vote against 
unionization, and 5.3 percent did not know how they would vote. (Personal communication 
from Thomas A. Kochan to Stephen B. Goldberg, Nov. 4, 1980). 
66. See T. KOCHAN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 182-83 
(1980) ("[T]he dominant policy of U.S. employers has historically and currently been strongly 
to oppose efforts to unionize a heretofore unorganized company or work force."), 
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ployer have reason to suspect that their employer, too, will be op-
posed to unionization. To be sure that employees believe that their 
employer may be opposed to unionization does not necessarily mean 
that they anticipate the possible use, or threatened use, of economic 
power. A capable union organizer will, however, mention this possi-
bility so that employees can develop psychological defenses that pre-
vent an apparent union majority from crumbling in the face of the 
employer's economic threats. Indeed, in two thirds of the union 
campaigns we studied, the union warned employees that the em-
ployer would seek to persuade or frighten employees into voting 
against the union. In sum, the combination of what employees may 
reasonably anticipate based on common knowledge of how many 
employers respond to unionization, and what the union may warn 
them of, makes it unlikely that the faint of heart are not weeded out 
of the ranks of potential union supporters in advance of the em-
ployer's anti-union campaign, regardless of whether the employer's 
pre-campaign conduct suggests the likelihood of vigorous and possi-
bly unlawful campaigning.67 
Another general area of reviewer comments focused on our find-
ings that some voters did change their minds during the campaign, 
that those changes tended to be in the direction of the company ( a 
substantial majority of the undecided and the switchers voted 
against union representation), and that the number of switchers was 
substantially greater in some elections than in others. Thus, the av-
erage loss in union support from card sign to vote was four percent; 
but in the five most successful company campaigns the average loss 
was thirty-five percent.68 Furthermore, the votes of the undecided 
and the switchers were necessary for victory in nine of thirty-one 
elections. 
We concluded that neither the fact of change in the direction of 
the company, nor the rate of that change, was related to the use of 
unlawful campaign tactics, but we could go no further. We could 
find no characteristics that distinguished the more successful cam-
paigns from the less successful. Nor, except for those few employees 
who switched to a union vote, could we find an explanation for 
switching. 
Our inability to document the factors that cause voters to switch, 
particularly to the company, created a substantial intellectual vac-
67. Professor Peck concedes that "[i)f employees generally anticipate hostility and use of 
economic force, the study is valid despite its use of elections in which such conduct was pre-
dictable." Peck, supra note 22, at 20. 
68. Law and Reality at 100. 
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uum - and book reviewers abhor a vacuum. Something must take 
place that causes voters to switch more often in some elections than 
others, and the critics were eager to speculate as to what that some-
thing might be. Former NLRB Chairman Edward Miller suggested 
that the answer might lie in the subtle pressure exerted by employ-
ees' knowledge of the views of a "really good supervisor" or a "well-
liked employee."69 Professor Flanagan focused on the firmness with 
which initial voting intentions are held, 70 and Professor Eames 
stated that the data suggested, contrary to our conclusion, that the 
key to vote switching was the employer's use of coercion and unfair 
labor practices.71 
As far as the speculations of former Chairman Miller and Profes-
sor Flanagan are concerned, we have little to say. The firmness with 
which initial voting intentions are held may well be cruci~l, and for 
those voters whose initial intent is not firm, the subtle influence ex-
erted by a respected supervisor or fellow employee may be decisive. 
But the data were not collected with the intention of determining 
whether either of these factors explained vote, and they therefore fail 
to do so ( except that they do show that whatever effect trusted super-
visors or fellow employees had on vote, it was not to transmit cam-
paign messages).72 Nor was it relevant, for our purposes, whether 
these or other campaign tactics did affect vote - except to the extent 
those tactics are unlawful. Stated in another way, the fact that some 
campaign tactics have an effect on the voters does not, of itself, sup-
port Board regulation of the campaign. One must ask whether the 
particular effect falls within the Board's area of regulation. If it does 
not, the fact of its existence does not justify regulation based on the 
· existence of some other assumed effect. Thus, the fact, if such it be, 
that the views of trusted supervisors or fellow employees affect vote 
would show that some campaign tactics affect vote, but it would 
hardly justify Board regulation of those currently unlawful tactics 
which do not affect vote. 
Professor Eames's suggestion that the data show that unfair labor 
practices and coercion cause some potential union voters to vote 
against union representation requires a more detailed response. This 
suggestion is based on the following table:73 
69. Miller, supra note 17, at 1165-66. 
70. Flanagan, supra note 19, at 1199-1200. See Ross, supra note 22, at 564-65. 
71. Eames, supra note 18, at ll89. 
72. Law and Reality at 128 n.28. 
73. Id at 115. 
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PROPORTION OF POTENTIAL UNION VOTERS WHO VOTED AGAINST 
UNION REPRESENTATION IN CLEAN, UNLAWFUL, AND 
BARGAINING ORDER ELECTIONS 
Type of Campaign 
Bargaining 
Type of Clean Unlawful Order 
Potential Percent Percent Percent 
Union Voting Voting Voting 
Voter Company N Company N Company N F p 
Intent undecided .60 15 .65 26 .79 19 .77 NS 
Intent union .o7 284 .IO 436 .09 224 .66 NS 
Attitude predicted 
union vote .08 291 .IO 451 .09 238 .31 NS 
Card-signer .09 3ll .16 487 .ll 235 4.45 .01 
According to Professor Eames: 
Table 5-3 . . . shows that the percent of the "undecided" voters who 
voted company in the elections with the highest degree of violations 
was 79; in the elections with the middle degree of violations, the per-
cent of the ''undecideds" voting company was 65; in the elections with 
the fewest violations, the percent of the "undecideds" voting company 
was 60. I understand the authors to be saying that this variation - 79 
percent to 65 percent to 60 percent - is not statistically significant. As 
a lay reader of statistics, I cannot challenge that observation. But a 
variation in this direction certainly does not support any conclusion 
that unfair labor practices/coercion will not have an impact on the cru-
cial - that is, movable - voters, and indeed, suggests the opposite 
conclusion. 74 
Professor Eames errs to the extent that she suggests that the sta-
tistically nonsignificant tendency of the undecided voters to vote 
against union representation more often in unlawful elections than 
in clean elections, and more often in bargaining order elections than 
in unlawful elections, supports the conclusion that unfair labor prac-
tices affect vote. The reason that this trend is not significant is not 
because of some arcane law of statistics, unintelligible to the legal 
mind, and capable of being dismissed as unimportant. Rather, it is 
due to the important fact that the number of initially undecided vot-
ers was so small (a total of 60 out of a sample in excess of 1000) that 
the tendency observed by Professor Eames could be due to pure 
chance. The laws of statistics tell us no more than common sense 
would tell us - an apparent relationship between two factors that 
might well be due to chance ought not be relied upon. 
Of course, if the trend that Professor Eames points out among 
74. Eames, supra note 18, at 1188-89. 
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the initially undecided voters existed equally among other potential 
union voters, one might regard it as important, albeit not statistically 
significant. In fact, however, there was no general tendency for more 
potential union voters to vote company as the amount of unlawful 
campaigning by the employer increased. To be sure, the proportion 
of potential union voters voting company increases slightly (but not 
significantly, except for card-signers) as one moves from clean to un-
lawful elections, but it then decreases as one moves from unlawful 
elections to bargaining order elections. In no category of potential 
union voter was there a statistically significant difference between 
the proportion voting company in elections with all lawful 
campaigning and the proportion voting company in elections with 
unlawful campaigning. 
Professor Eames's suggestion that unfair labor practices affect the 
crucial group of potential swing voters is further undercut by Table 
5-4,75 which shows that in every category of potential union voter, 
those who voted for union representation were more likely to have 
perceived unlawful campaigning than were those who voted against 
union representation. These data are consistent with those for the 
entire sample, which showed that union voters as a whole were more 
likely to perceive unlawful campaigning than were company voters, 
and that they were as likely to perceive it when the Board did not 
find it had occurred as when the Board did find that it had occurred. 
The cumulative effect of these data points strongly to the conclu-
sion that those employees who are contemplating a union vote are 
sensitive to intimations by the employer that it will use economic 
power to punish union supporters and reward union opponents. 
This sensitivity is no greater when the employer conveys this 
message in unlawful terms than when it does so in lawful terms, and 
causes no greater loss in union support in the former situation than 
in the latter. Hence, as we have previously suggested, there is little 
justification, at least in terms of protecting employee choice, for at-
tempting to distinguish between lawful and unlawful campaigning. 
In addition to the criticisms of our methodology and findings, 
there were criticisms of our recommendations for change in NLRB 
law and practice. Perhaps the most common of the latter criticisms 
was directed at the recommendations that campaign speech be freed 
of all legal regulation, and that election results not be set aside be-
cause of either speech or conduct. The critics made two related ar-
guments. First, they observed that the campaigns we studied were 
15. I.Aw and Reality at 121. 
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conducted under the existing regulatory scheme, and that the regula-
tory scheme may have deterred egregiously unlawful speech and 
conduct which, if engaged in, would have a substantial effect on em-
ployee choice. Second, it was argued that if our recommendations 
were followed, many employers would engage in precisely that egre-
giously unlawful conduct that would interfere with employee 
choice.76 
Perhaps the central response to this line of argument is that we 
do not propose legalizing that conduct which uses the employer's ec-
onomic power to coerce employees into voting against union repre-
sentation. To be sure, we would deprive the Board of the power to 
set aside elections on the basis of coercive conduct, but this power is 
not, of itself, a substantial deterrent to employer coercion. The only 
penalty imposed on an employer as the result of a set aside order is 
that the Board conducts a re-run election. Since the union has a 
statutory opportunity for a second election within twelve months of 
the first, wholly without regard to a Board set aside order, 77 and 
since a determined employer can delay an election held pursuant to 
a set aside order for nearly that long,78 the employer suffers little, if 
at all, from such a Board order. Hence, depriving the Board of the 
power to set aside elections on the basis of coercive employer con-
duct would not remove a substantial deterrent to employer coercion. 
Furthermore, we recommend that the Board be provided with addi-
tional remedial authority which would deter coercive conduct. If 
that recommendation is accepted, there is no reason to assume that 
the removal of authority to set aside elections because of coercive 
employer conduct would increase the frequency of such conduct. 
Grants of benefit designed to encourage employees to vote 
76. Miller, supra note 17, at 1170-71; Shapiro, supra note 22, at 1540; Kochan, supra note 
20, at 1121. But see Flanagan, supra note 19, at 1203-05; Lopatka, supra note 22, at 434. 
77. National Labor Relations Act§ 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1976). 
78. If the Regional Director sustains a union's objection to employer conduct allegedly 
affecting the outcome of the election, and directs a re-run election, the employer can normally 
appeal the Regional Director's decision to the Board. See Rules and Regulations of the 
NLRB, series 8, 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(b) (1980). Data are not available on the median or mean 
time between the original election and the Board's decision in such cases. (Conversation be-
tween Stephen B. Goldberg and Joseph Moore, Associate Executive Secretary, NLRB, Dec. 2, 
1980). A tabulation of all election cases in the most recent volume of NLRB Reports shows, 
however, that in a similar type of case-that in which the employer appeals to the Board from 
a Regional Director's decision denying employer objections - the mean time from the con-
duct of the original election to the Board's decision was 8 months, 11 days. See Jamak, Inc., 
239 N.L.R.B. 1274 (1979); Eastern Rock Prod., Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 892 (1978); Eventide S., 239 
N.L.R.B. 894 (1978); General Knit of Cal., Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978); Hickory Springs 
Mfg. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 641 (1978); Maremont Corp., 239 N.L.R.B. 240 (1978); Newport News 
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 82 (1978); The Standard Register Co., 239 
N.L.R.B. 1066 (1978). 
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against union representation would not be unlawful under the regu-
latory scheme we propose, and it is likely that grants (and promises) 
of benefit would increase. As we stated, however, 
We do not regard this as a cause for concern. While the Board charac-
terizes a grant or promise of benefits by an employer as a form of 
"pressure and compulsion," we reject this characterization. An em-
ployee is free to choose union representation despite promises or grants 
of benefit by the employer. He may not lawfully be penalized for do-
ing so. If, under these circumstances, an employee wishes to rely on 
the employer's promises or grants of benefit as a reason for rejecting 
union representation, his decision would appear wholly free.79 
There were, interestingly, no critical comments on this aspect of the 
book. Either this particular heresy passed unnoticed in the greater 
heresies, or the labor relations community is intellectually prepared 
for the overruling of Exchange Parts. so 
Returning to the greater heresy, we do propose the elimination of 
all legal restrictions on speech. Would that proposal, if adopted, 
lead to an increase in the frequency of overt threats of reprisal? 
There are a number of reasons, set out in Law and Reality, for think-
ing this would not occur. First, such statements could be used as 
evidence if the employer were charged with retaliating against em-
ployees for engaging in union activities. Since the penalties for en-
gaging in retaliatory conduct are to be substantially increased under 
our proposal, most employers should be deterred from making state-
ments that would provide clear evidence of retaliatory intent. Fur-
thermore, some employers might fear the risk of a backlash from 
overt threats of reprisal. A final deterrent would be provided by the 
possibility of a union victory, and the harm such threats would do to 
a future bargaining relationship. 
In sum, the reforms that we propose would not lead to an in-
crease in acts of reprisal, and we think it unlikely that they would 
lead to an increase in threats of reprisal. They might lead to an in-
crease in promises or grants of benefit, but neither of those are in-
consistent with the free choice that the Act seeks to protect. 
79. Law and Reality at 160. 
80. Fonner Chairman Miller did, to be sure, refer to the "raw and ugly power of threats 
and bribes" (Miller, supra note 17, at 1174 (emphasis supplied)), the latter being presumably a 
reference to promises and grants of benefit. Inasmuch, however, as a central purpose of the 
NLRA is to enable employees to improve their wages and working conditions, it is difficult to 
understand why an improvement in wages or working conditions constitutes a "bribe," rather 
than an attainment of the statutory goal. See Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in 
Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. Rev. 38, 112-16 
(1964); Bailey, The Rule Against Employer Grants of Benefits During Union Organizing 
Campaigns: Outdated and Unnecessary (unpublished third-year paper, Harvard Law School, 
1980). 
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It has also been argued that even if currently unlawful campaign-
ing does not interfere with employee free choice, and the deregula-
tion of speech would not lead to an increased volume of threats or 
promises, both threats and promises should be unlawful on symbolic 
grounds. This point was perhaps best made (as so many were) by 
former Chairman Miller. He wrote: 
I cannot recall who said that myths are the only real truths. The 
democratic mythology includes a belief that voters are rational, that 
they do concern themselves about issues they believe are important, 
and that they ought to be able to make their choices free of the raw and 
ugly power of threats and bribes. That credo may well survive a dozen 
studies like this one, which tend to show that many voters don't always 
take seriously all the issues which the campaigners put before them 
and that many voters have become resistant to unlawful pressures. 
And maybe - just maybe - a democracy which tolerates an expen-
sive process to implement the mythology and which conscientiously 
tries to hold industrial elections to "laboratory standards" will be seen 
by historians as having been, after all, worthwhile.81 
Apart from the somewhat inflated claim for even the symbolic 
value of NLRB campaign regulation, there is at least one fundamen-
tal problem with Mr. Miller's paean to the glories of that regulation 
- it doesn't work. The Board has no idea what speech or conduct 
interferes with free choice, and in setting aside an election because it 
believes "laboratory conditions" have not been attained, it is as 
likely to frustrate as to advance free choice. While myths have their 
value, it is self-defeating to cling to a myth that is not only inconsis-
tent with reality, but also impedes efforts to deal effectively with that 
reality. 
Some reviewers also criticized our recommendation that an em-
ployer who holds campaign meetings on working time and premises 
should be required to allow the union to hold such meetings on 
working time and premises. 82 This recommendation was based, in 
part, on the findings that far more employees attend company meet-
ings than union meetings, and that attendance at campaign meetings 
is powerfully correlated with campaign familiarity. Several review-
ers made the point, in response, that there was no evidence that cam-
paign familiarity affected vote. Hence, they suggested, whatever 
advantage the employer may have in familiarizing voters with its 
campaign is irrelevant, and does not justify a recommendation 
aimed at increasing union campaign familiarity.83 
81. Miller, supra note 17, at 1174. See Shapiro, supra note 22, at 1541-42. 
82. See text at notes 26-33 supra. 
83. Goetz & Wike, supra note 16, at 384-85; Miller, supra note 17, at 1171-72. 
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One rejoinder, which was made in the book, is that this criticism 
overstates the data on lack of campaign impact. While there was no 
evidence that attending company meetings or familiarity with the 
content of the company campaign was associated with switching to 
the company, there was evidence that attending union meetings and 
familiarity with the union campaign were associated with switching 
to the union. There was also evidence that those employees who 
attended union meetings were usually already committed to the 
union. Hence, the data do justify recommending union access to em-
ployees on working time and premises - without such access the 
union is at a disadvantage in communicating with those employees 
who might vote either company or union, and for whom increased 
knowledge of the union might be crucial. 84 
There is yet another aspect in which the union may be at a sub-
stantial disadvantage when the employer conducts campaign meet-
ings on working time and premises, and denies the union an 
opportunity to do likewise. As we suggested, the fact of the em-
ployer's campaign, wholly apart from its content, may be effective in 
persuading employees to vote against union representation. The em-
ployer who conducts a meeting during working hours graphically 
demonstrates that it is aware of the dissatisfaction that led to the 
union organizing drive, and is sufficiently concerned about that dis-
satisfaction to suspend production in order to deal with it. Further-
more, whatever the employer has to say about unionization is 
communicated in an orderly fashion in the very place where it is 
relevant - the workplace. In contrast, the union that is denied an 
opportunity to meet with employees on company premises and can 
attract only a small fraction of those employees to a union meeting 
off company premises is forced to communicate in a wholly catch-as-
catch can fashion. Employee supporters of the union must attempt 
to catch other employees in the brief time they have for lunch, on 
break, or in other nonworking moments on company property. 
Nonemployee organizers, barred from the premises, have the still 
more difficult task of attempting to communicate with employees as 
they enter the employer's premises anxious to start work on time or 
leave the premises to return home. The union organizer can, to be 
sure, pursue the employee to that home, but his or her visit there is 
84. Indeed, union access to employees may be considerably more important than employer 
access. All employees know something about their wages, benefits, and working conditions, 
but some will have had no experience at all with unions, and even more will have had no 
experience with the particular union seeking to represent them. 
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apt to be regarded as an intrusion - particularly by the very em-
ployees who are not already union supporters. 
The contrast between the image of the employer - in control in 
the workplace, stating its position in an orderly fashion - and the 
union organizer - scurrying about on the outside, attempting to say 
a few hurried words - is striking. To the extent that the fact of the 
campaign, apart from its content, has an effect on vote, the union's 
exclusion from company premises also places it at a substantial dis-
advantage in communicating to employees one of its central 
messages - that it, just as much as the company, is a responsible 
organization, that it is capable of dealing with the company on equal 
terms, and that it is as worthy a candidate for the employees' trust as 
is the employer. We think that equal access can be justified because 
it can redress that campaign disadvantage. 
Finally, increased muon access to employees must be seen as one 
element in our total package of recommendations. Our proposal 
that government regulation of speech be terminated rests, in part, on 
the expectation that each party will be able to point out to the voters 
those aspects of the other party's campaign it believes to be untruth-
ful or unfair. Unions will have that ability only if they have the 
opportunity to communicate on equal terms with the employer. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the final analysis, the fate of the substantive recommendations 
contained in Law and Reality may be less important than how the 
Board treats that study. As Professor Shapiro recognized, the study 
"took about a decade from conception to publication and . . . cost a 
small fortune."85 If other researchers and funding agencies are to 
commit the time, energy, and funds necessary to carry out additional 
empirical research on those aspects of the labor-management rela-
tionship that the Board regulates, they must have some assurance 
that the results of their research will be taken seriously. It is not too 
late for the Board to provide that type of response to this research. 
We hope that it will do so._ 
85. Shapiro, supra note 22, at 1532. 
